

WORKING PAPER
27 April 1964

INTERAGENCY MATTERS

General

1. Everybody in Washington who is concerned with the facts knows that the DCI at this time has not focused the effort of his staff in such a way or made supporting interagency arrangements as to make possible a comprehensive and continuous evaluation of intelligence programs conducted by the operating departments and agencies involved. Hence, any unqualified DCI reply to Bureau budgetary questions at this time will have to be considered by the Bureau as descriptive, substantive judgments, at best.

2. The timing of reply established by the Bureau highlights what can be considered as a flaw in its own arrangements for interagency actions. To date, there is no standing prescription for the submission of "spring preview" estimates by all departments and agencies. Hence, the "short fuse" letter requests that are sent out each spring by the Bureau to the departments and agencies do not provide for either the time or means for interagency coordination on ~~those~~ functional programs, like intelligence, which involve more than one agency.

3. I understand that the Department of Defense, which supports so large a part of the total U.S. intelligence effort, is

being asked this year to present its spring preview estimate, FY 1964 through FY 1970, to the Bureau at about the same time as other agencies. This estimate will be presented within the structure of its appropriations, and not by functional program area. Program data detail, approved by the Secretary, will not be available until about August and then only as guidance to the Services for their preparation of FY 1966 budget estimates.

Specifics

".... we [Bureau of Budget] are asking that you identify:

1. the budgetary implications of the various special studies of broad intelligence program areas now being conducted under your sponsorship"

Comment: We ought to be able to respond to this along the following lines:

a. The most significant and immediate benefits of the studies will be the identification of possible improvements in: (a) targeting specific intelligence collection and processing efforts, and (b) management arrangements and procedures, both within and between the departments and agencies involved.

b. Identification of significant budgetary impacts

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will have to await implementation of improvements noted in a, above. FY 1966 is earliest possible time-frame to expect any such impact.

2. "... any other communitywide program reviews you may have undertaken."

Comment: This presents an opportunity to mention benefits to be expected from the revised membership in the USIB and the evolving roles of certain committees of the USIB, such as CCPC:

a. Substantive "output" improvements first.

b. Better guidance to the community which will translate into improvements in ^{community} efficiency, in time.

3. "... any comments on these areas [CCP and NRE] you may wish to make."

Comment: (Note applicability of comments under item 4, below:

a. With regard to the CCP area:

(1) Do not attempt to make a unilateral and hasty projection of resources for this area. We are not properly equipped for this at this time.

(2) We could make reference to comments furnished to the President's Board recently.

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(3) We could mention the present review of requirements for COMINT which will clarify the "requirements base" in past (COMINT only), and thereby establish a basis for choice.

b. With regard to the NRP area: ?

4. "... your views as to the magnitude of the over-all intelligence effort which you believe will be required between now and fiscal year 1969 and any changes you may anticipate in the basic 'mix' of collection techniques."

Comment: In view of the Secretary of Defense program development cycle for FY 1966, he and his staff will not be inclined at this time to commit themselves to anything but appropriation dollar levels for projections to be submitted to the Bureau. The Secretary will be reluctant to take even tentative positions on program component estimates at this time. If he did, it would tend to remove "the market place" factor from the program reviews now in motion within DOD and would substitute rather arbitrary ceilings (or targets to justify) by program area.

However, if the DCI planned to make some estimates on program projections and changes in mix within community totals, it seems to me he would have to first do

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these things, in view of preponderant Defense dollar interests:

(1) Obtain Secretary of Defense agreement to such estimates (as components of Defense total programs) for at least "talking" purposes.

(2) Obtain Secretary of Defense agreement as to: (a) who would effect any significant changes projected in the mix, and (b) how it would be accomplished. (Somebody else will raise the questions of "why" on any specific details involved.)

The NRP area would prove to be an exception to all of the above because of the manner in which this is programmed and budgeted within the Department. However, offsets taken in other intelligence programs, based on NRP decisions, would be subject to the caveats ^{suggested} stated.

In soliciting the DCI views here, it is believed the Bureau is raising the question of the adequacy of present arrangements for supporting the DCI in his community role.

5. "Since the spring program review will concentrate on major long-term objectives and policy issues, figures are important in terms of general orders of magnitude only. Such figures will

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provide an adequate basis for the target amounts and other guidelines for the 1966 budget which we would expect the President to establish after the program review has been completed."

Comment: Does this suggest a prominent facet in the DCI community role? If so, should the DCI work under, with or in parallel with the Bureau? If the latter were attempted, one would find a very strong institutional and negative bias in the Bureau, even though this organization knows well that many different roads lead to "Rome."

Conclusions

1. The DCI should not attempt to make a unilateral dollar projection for U.S. intelligence programs this Spring.
2. If the DCI wishes to participate in the preparation of guidance for the development of intelligence programs ^{Thompson} and the FY 1966 budget, he should base his judgements on data that should be available in the August-September 1964 period.
3. The DCI may wish to note the discontinuity between programming cycles in the agencies ~~as compared with~~ ^{and} the Bureau's requirements (as it impacts on his interests) and note that he is looking into staff and procedural arrangements to see what can be done.

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